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Abstract
We analyze firms’ incentives to cluster in an industrial district to benefit from
reciprocal technology spillovers. A simple model of cumulative innovation is pre-
sented where technology spillovers arise endogenously through labor mobility. It is
shown that firms’ incentives to cluster are the strongest when the following three
conditions are met: 1) technological progress is rapid; 2) competition in the product
market is relatively soft; 3) the probability of a single firm to develop an innovation
is neither very high nor very low. We show that some trade secret protection is al-
ways beneficial for firms’ profits and stimulates clustering. Excessive protection may
impede technology spillovers and reduce firms’ incentives to cluster.
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1 Introduction
During the 80s and the 90s Silicon Valley has been the prototypical example of a successful
local industrial district. In the mid 90s it was home to twenty percent of the world’s largest
technology companies (Businessweek, 25.08.1997) and the mean income was 50 percent
higher than the national figure (Audretsch, 1998). The recipe of its success has been
studied extensively and several attempts have been promoted to replicate the industrial
structure of Silicon Valley elsewhere in the world.
The clustering of many technology companies in a circumscribed geographical area
generates several important eﬀects (see, e.g., Marshall, 1920). First, the local market for
inputs and services expands: on the one hand, this allows providers of inputs to achieve
a higher degree of specialization and lower their prices; on the other hand, technology
companies can deepen their own capabilities by relying on external sources for the supply
of skills, technologies, and other resources.1 Second, the concentration of firms attracts a
’deep’ pool of workers. In turn, this implies that firms and workers are better matched
and are less likely to be restricted in their labor demand and supply, respectively.
Finally, there is a technology spillover eﬀect, which is the focus of our paper.2 Techno-
logical knowledge and information, more in general, are extremely diﬃcult to keep confined
within the boundary of the firm due to their ethereal nature. The empirical evidence shows
that firms’ productivity increases thanks to spillovers but the beneficial eﬀects of spillovers
decay with geographic distance (Alemeida and Kogut, 1999; Jaﬀe et al., 1993; Acs et al.,
1994). This provides an argument for spillover driven clustering. In other words, firms may
want to cluster to enjoy technology spillovers from each other.3 Such spillovers may be the
result of voluntary exchanges of information, informal talks among employees, mobility of
workers, or even industrial espionage.
To many, the flow of technological information across the industry has been one of the
main reasons for the success of Silicon Valley. However, this argument, after a second
thought, appears at least incomplete. When technological knowledge is widespread at the
level of the industry, an important source of competitive advantage is leveled out - firms
must compete on equal footing. Especially when product market competition is intense,
1 ”By focusing on what they did best and purchasing the reminder from specialist suppliers, they created
a network system that spread the costs of developing new technologies, reduced product-development times,
fostered reciprocal innovation.” (Saxenian, 1994). Following Krugman (1991), this eﬀect has been studied
extensively in the recent literature.
2Needless to say that clustering might have other eﬀects. Some of them, such as congestion, might be
undesirable.
3Audretsch and Feldman (1996) find evidence in this direction showing that technology intensive indus-
tries tend to cluster more than other industries after controlling for geographic concentration of production.
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firms might try to locate in distant areas in order to minimize technology spillovers and
preserve their competitive advantage. Ultimately, the presence of technology spillovers
might turn out to be a reason against industrial clustering.
However, as Saxenian (1994) has nicely documented, technology companies cluster in
Silicon Valley, engineers and technical workers change jobs repeatedly contributing to the
creation of technology spillovers, and nevertheless firms compete vigorously in the product
market. She reports that the annual turnover rate among highly-skilled personnel in Silicon
Valley was approximately 20-25% and argues that such movement of workers between
employers (and start-ups) is the result of a business culture that supports job hopping.
Refining this argument, some legal scholars have stressed that trade secret protection is
weak in California, and argued that this might explain the high labor turnover (Hyde,
1998; Gilson, 1999).4 However, both explanations of the high mobility of personnel seem
to forget that firms have monetary instruments to keep their employees - they might simply
pay a higher wage in order to avoid turnover and constrain the outward knowledge flow.
In this paper we build a simple model that oﬀers an economic rationale to the empirical
evidence discussed above. An entrepreneur (a firm) needs a researcher (a worker) to run his
R&D department. An important ingredient of our model is that knowledge and innovation
are cumulative. The R&D activity gives rise to knowledge, which is valuable both for
directly commercializing a product (first generation) and for being the basis for a new and
better version of the product (second generation). We follow Pakes and Nitzan (1983)
and endogenize technology spillovers through labor mobility.5 After having successfully
developed the first generation product, the worker can move to a rival firm enabling it to
freely use the knowledge. The movement of the worker contributes to make the knowledge
widespread at the industry level thereby rising the likelihood that the second generation
product will be developed. We explicitly consider the competition for the services of the
worker, and technology spillovers arise only if the rival firm is willing to oﬀer a higher wage
to the worker than the current employer.
Contrary to what is typically found in the literature,6 we show that labor mobility
and technology spillovers can also occur when product market competition is particularly
tough. This result crucially depends on the cumulative nature of the innovation. We also
show that the parameter space under which labor mobility occurs expands when the value
4A trade secret is any valuable piece of information that is not commonly known in the industry and that
the firm makes an eﬀort to protect. Trade secret laws protect a firm’s trade secrets from misappropriation
by, e.g., former employees or rival firms. See also discussion in section 5.
5 See also Fosfuri et al. (2001), Rønde (2001), and Gersbach and Schmutzler (2002).
6 See, for example, Pakes and Nitzan (1983) and Fosfuri et al. (2001).
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of the second generation product is large relative to the first.
We then move a step backwards in the game tree and allow firms to choose locations.
Each firm can either decide to locate in a separate region or to ’cluster’ in the same area as
the rival. In our model, technology spillovers are the only reason for firms to cluster. Put
diﬀerently, technology spillovers are a necessary condition for firms to cluster. However,
technology spillovers are not a suﬃcient condition, because workers earn a higher expected
wage when firms locate together. In equilibrium, firms cluster only if the expected benefits
from technology spillovers outweigh the additional wage bill.
As argued above, technology spillovers generate two opposing eﬀects: On the one hand,
technology spillovers increase the probability that the more valuable, second generation
product is developed. This is the eﬀect usually stressed in the more informal discussions
of Silicon Valley. On the other hand, firms are more likely to end up with similar products
and, therefore, to compete more vigorously in the product market. We identify three
conditions that increase the benefits from technology spillovers and firms’ incentive to
cluster. First, product market competition is soft. Second, the probability of a single firm
developing the second generation product is neither very small nor very large. Third, the
value of the second generation product is high relative to the first.
Finally, we use our framework to analyze how the degree of trade secret protection
aﬀects both the decision to cluster and the intensity of labor mobility. We show that trade
secret protection, except in some extreme cases, is beneficial for firms’ profits, stimulates
clustering, and is not an impediment to workers’ mobility.
We now turn to the related literature. Mai and Peng (1985) use a modified Hotelling
framework to study localized spillovers and industrial clustering. They assume that firms
enjoy more spillovers when locating closer to each other. However, competition gets at
the same time tougher, so firms never cluster completely. We consider a simpler, discrete
choice of location in our model, but endogenize the source of spillovers, which is left as a
’black-box’ in Mai and Peng (1985).
There are two recent papers that study the functioning of industrial clusters when
spillovers arise through labor mobility, but focus on issues complementary to the ones
analyzed in this paper. Cooper (2001) looks at firms’ and workers’ investment in R&D
and human capital, respectively: an aspect that we treat only in a rudimentary way.
However, he abstracts from the strategic interaction between the labor and the product
markets, which plays a crucial role in our model, and does not consider the location choice
of firms. Combes and Duranton (2001) also use the model introduced by Pakes and Nitzan
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(1983) as a building block. We share the conclusion that weak product market competition
leads to more clustering.7 There are, however, a number of diﬀerences between their and
our work. Most importantly, we focus on cumulative innovations and trade secret laws
whereas Combes and Duranton consider the interaction between product diﬀerentiation
and the ’absorptive capacity’ of firms.
Our paper is also related to the literature on patents and cumulative R&D (Scotchmer,
1991; Green and Scotchmer, 1995). Bessen and Maskin (2000) present a simple model of
cumulative R&D, and ask the question of whether patent protection leads to more or to
less innovation. The analysis of patent protection is diﬀerent from that of trade secret
protection, but Bessen and Maskin also reach the conclusion that very strong protection
of intellectual property may slow down innovation and reduce overall welfare.
2 The Model
2.1 The first period
Consider a world where there are two periods and two entrepreneurs each running a firm.
Denote the two firms as A and B respectively. At the beginning of the game, firms must
choose irrevocably their locations. The firms can either decide to locate in separate regions
or to cluster in the same area. The firms have no marketable product at this stage. After
locating, each firm hires a researcher (a worker) to develop a product. The worker is hired
from a pool of identical workers. Workers have a reservation wage w, which is normalized
to zero. Workers are wealth-constrained and cannot borrow on the financial markets, so
the first-period wage must be non-negative.
Each firm undertakes a R&D project that has an exogenous probability s of succeeding.
The successes of the two firms’ R&D projects are independently distributed. We assume
for time being that R&D is costless, but relax this assumption in section 5. A successful
project leads to an innovation that we shall denote as innovation 1. With probability
(1− s) the project is unsuccessful, and the firm stays out of the market in the first period.
Once the innovation process is resolved, production takes place, the good is sold, and first
period profits are realized. The value of marketing innovation 1 as a monopolist is π1. If
both firms develop the innovation, the duopoly profits are απ1. The parameter α measures
the degree of product market competition, with lower values of α associated with tougher
competition. We shall assume that α ∈
£
0, 12
¤
.
7However, thanks to the cumulative nature of knowledge, we find that technology spillovers and clus-
tering also occur when product market competition is very intense, an outcome that never shows up in
Combes and Duranton.
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2.2 The second period
Firms have in the second period the possibility to develop a new and better version of
the product (innovation 2), but only if they have access to the knowledge created when
developing innovation 1. R&D is therefore cumulative. This knowledge also allows firms
to market innovation 1 if they fail to develop innovation 2. We assume again that R&D
is costless and that the probability of success is s (conditional on having the necessary
knowledge) and is independently distributed across firms.8 Innovation 2 is drastic with
respect to innovation 1. Hence, a firm endowed with innovation 2 earns monopoly profits
both when the rival has innovation 1 and when it has no product at all. Monopoly profits
of marketing innovation 2 are π2, whereas duopoly profits are απ2.
We make a number of assumptions concerning the knowledge created in the first period.
First, the entrepreneur has access to all relevant information created in his firm. Therefore,
if the worker employed in the first period leaves, the entrepreneur can instruct a new
worker and continue the R&D activities uninterruptedly. Second, if the two firms have
experienced the same R&D outcome in the first period (either success or failure), they have
the same knowledge and have no gains from acquiring each other’s knowledge. Third, after
developing innovation 1 the worker has all the relevant information and is free to use it
in the rival firm in the second period. Trade secret laws are thus ineﬀective. Finally, if
an unsuccessful firm hires the successful rival’s employee, it immediately acquires all the
relevant knowledge.9 These four assumptions are mainly simplifying, and we will discuss
and relax some of them later. Notice that a worker possesses valuable knowledge only if
he has worked for the only successful firm in period 1. In all other states of the world,
workers are simply paid the reservation wage.
The outcome of the second period depends on the results of R&D activities in the first
period. We will therefore describe the game in the second period for the diﬀerent possible
states of the world.
No firm has developed innovation 1 The firms start all over again, and everything
is as in period 1 except that firms do not choose location.
8 In an earlier version we allowed the probability to develop innovation 2 to diﬀer from the probability
to develop innovation 1. Since there were no additional insights to be gained, we assumed here that the
probabilities are the same.
9There is thus an implicit assumption that the R&D activities of the two firms are complementary in
the sense that starting from the same knowledge they may come up with diﬀerent ideas of how to develop
innovation 2.
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Both firms have developed innovation 1 The two firms aim at developing innovation
2. A firm earns π2 if it is the only one to develop innovation 2 whereas the rival earns 0.
The firms earn απ2 if they both succeed and απ1 if they both fail.
Only one firm has developed innovation 1 Assume that firm A has developed
innovation 1 and firm B has not (the other case is analogous). Firm B would like to
hire the employee of firm A to acquire the knowledge necessary to develop innovation 2.10
We shall assume that this is only feasible when firms are located in the same region, for
instance, because relocation costs or informational costs of identifying the ’right’ worker
are large across regions. This assumption is relaxed in section 5. We need to consider the
two subgames where the firms are in the same region and in separate regions.
Suppose that the firms have chosen separate locations. Firm A tries to develop inno-
vation 2 and firm B innovation 1. Firm A drives firm B out of the market if it is successful
and earns π2. If firm A fails, but firm B succeeds, both firms earn απ1. Finally, if both
firms fail, firm A earns π1 and firm B earns 0.
Suppose instead that the firms have chosen a joint location. At beginning of the second
period, firm B tries to hire the worker that was employed by firm A in the first period.
Obviously, firm A would like to retain the worker in order to have a head start in the
second period. We model the competition for the worker in the following way. Each firm
simultaneously and independently makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the worker. The firm
who oﬀers more hires the worker and pays the wage that it has oﬀered. Put diﬀerently, the
hiring process works like a first-price auction. If both firms oﬀer the same wage, we assume
that the firm whose valuation of the worker is highest hires him. The tie-breaking rule
ensures that an equilibrium in pure strategies exists. We shall focus on the equilibrium in
which the firm hiring the worker pays exactly the rival’s valuation.11 Each firm’s valuation
of the worker depends on its outside options that we shall derive later. If firm A retains the
worker, the game continues as in the subgame where the firms are in separate locations. If
firm B hires the worker, the game continues as in the state where both firms have developed
innovation 1 in the first period.
10We disregard licensing contracts, as it is very diﬃcult to license non-patented information. To illustrate
the problems that can arise when licensing trade secrets, suppose that the licensee (or the licensor) breaks
the contract by reselling the knowledge to an outside firm. Unlike a patent infringement, it is not enough
to show that the outside firm used the knowledge in question. The alleging party needs to demonstrate
that the outside firm bought the information and did not create it itself, which is obviously very diﬃcult.
See also Cheung (1982) for a discussion of these issues.
11We disregard equilibria where both firms oﬀer a wage between the lowest and the highest valuation
of the worker (and where the firm with the highest valuation hires him), since in these equilibria the firm
with the lowest valuation is playing a weakly dominated strategy.
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Figure 1 illustrates the game with all the possible states of the world and the actions
taken.
[Insert Figure 1]
3 Solving the model
We are now ready to solve the game. Let us start by computing each firm’s expected
profits if they locate in separate regions. Notice that in this case there is no possibility of
labor mobility, so technology spillovers cannot arise. We proceed by backward induction.
Let Vij be firm i’s expected profits before the second innovation round is resolved. Vij
is a function of the firm’s knowledge (subscript i) and the rival’s knowledge (subscript j),
with i, j ∈ {0, 1} where 1 indicates that the firm in question possesses the knowledge of the
first innovation and 0 indicates that it does not. There are four possible states of nature:
both firms have the knowledge, no firm has the knowledge, firm A or firm B alone has the
knowledge. Expected profits are:
V11 = s2απ2 + s (1− s)π2 + (1− s)2 απ1, (1)
V00 = s2απ1 + s (1− s)π1,
V10 = sπ2 + (1− s) sαπ1 + (1− s)2 π1,
V01 = s (1− s)απ1.
The per firm expected profits at time t = 0 if firms locate separately are therefore:
Πsep = s2 [απ1 + V11] + s (1− s) [π1 + V10 + V01] + (1− s)2 V00. (2)
We now focus on the other branch of the game tree in which firms decide to cluster at
t = 0. As above we proceed by backward induction.
Let us consider the hiring process. Recall that this plays a role only in asymmetric
situations. For simplicity of exposition, let us say that firm A has got innovation 1 and
firm B has not. Firm A will earn V10 if it keeps the worker, and V11 if it loses him to firm
B. Therefore, firm A’s valuation of the worker is vA = V10 − V11. Firm B will earn V11 if
it is successful in poaching the worker, and V01 if he stays with firm A. Firm B’s valuation
of the worker is vB = V11 − V01.
Two situations are possible: either vA ≥ vB, and firm A keeps the worker by paying him
wns = V11 − V01; or vA < vB, and firm B hires the worker by paying him ws = V10 − V11.
In the last case, we can talk about technology spillovers, since the knowledge becomes
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widespread across the industry. Notice that the worker in both cases will be paid more
than the wage in the pool. A joint location increases the expected wage of the workers,
because firms compete for the knowledge that the workers have accumulated in their prior
jobs.
The following result summarizes the outcome of the hiring process:
Lemma 1 Suppose that the firms are in a joint location, and only one firm has developed
innovation 1 in the first period. Technology spillovers arise if and only if 2V11 > V10+V01.
Proof. The worker moves if vA < vB. After substituting, this gives the condition
reported above.
Lemma 1 says that the worker moves only if this increases expected industry profits.
After some simplifications, one can rewrite the condition for technology spillovers to arise
as follows:
s
1− s
π2
π1
[1− 2 (1− α) s] > (1− s) (1− 2α) + 2sα. (3)
Figure 2 illustrates equation (3) as a function of (s, α) for a fixed value of π2/π1. From
(3), it follows that:
Remark 1 (1− α) s ≤ 1/2 and π2 > π1 are necessary conditions for technology spillovers
to arise.
The remark shows that technology spillovers cannot arise unless the value of innovation
2 is larger than that of innovation 1. Furthermore, s needs to be suﬃciently low and/or
competition suﬃciently soft (i.e. α suﬃciently high).
The technology spillover condition, equation (3), is a function of α, s, and π2/π1. Re-
member that when the worker moves from firm A to firm B, two opposite eﬀects occur to
expected joint profits: (1) both firms have now a chance to develop the second innovation,
i.e. the probability to develop the second innovation rises: this eﬀect increases expected
joint profits; (2) there is a higher probability that the firms end up in a duopoly situation:
this eﬀect decreases expected joint profits due to more competition. The overall result of a
change in α, s, and π2/π1 can be better understood in terms of these two eﬀects. It follows
from Lemma 1 that any change in these parameters that strengthens the first eﬀect, or
weakens the second, encourages technology spillovers, because technology spillovers arise
only if they increase joint expected profits.
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Labor turnover 
(technology spillovers)
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Figure 2. The technology spillover condition as a function of s and α (π2/π1 = 2). The
line indicates values of s and α such that equation (3) holds with equality. Above the
line, vA < vB and technology spillovers occur. Below the line, vA ≥ vB and firm A keeps
the worker in equilibrium.
Let us first consider α. There are less rents destroyed by competition if α increases,
because competition is softer. This weakens the second eﬀect and technology spillovers
arise for a larger region of parameters, as Figure 2 shows.
Let us now consider s. First, notice that when s approaches either 0 or 1, firms are
very likely to end up competing on equal footing in the product market, with the first and
the second generation product respectively. In turn, this implies that the second eﬀect is
stronger, which works against labor mobility. Hence, the parameter space under which
technology spillovers take place expands for intermediate values of s. Second, and more
important, notice that the marginal increment in the probability to develop innovation 2 of
having an additional firm sharing the knowledge of innovation 1 is s(1−s). Such marginal
increment is maximized for s = 0.5 and tends to 0 as s approaches either 0 or 1. Again the
eﬀect of a change in s is non-monotonous, with the parameter space for which technology
spillovers take place being the largest for intermediate values of s. Figure 2 illustrates this
point.
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Figure 3. The technology spillover condition for diﬀerent values of π2/π1.
Figure 3 shows the eﬀect of increasing the relative value of the second innovation, π2/π1.
An increase in π2/π1 implies that it is more important in terms of expected joint profits
that the second innovation is developed. This strengthens the first eﬀect and increases the
region of parameters for which technology spillovers arise. Interesting enough, technology
spillovers may occur even if competition among firms is extremely intense. Indeed, figure
2 illustrates how technology spillovers may arise for α = 0 if π2/π1 is suﬃciently high
and s ≤ 1/2. This is worthwhile noting because typically, with strong competition in the
product market, the innovator has greater incentives to retain the worker and technology
spillovers do not take place (Pakes and Nitzan, 1983; Fosfuri et al., 2001). However, in
this case the cumulative nature of innovation allows technology spillovers to materialize
even if product market competition is tough.
This last finding is empirically important too, as it suggests that we are more likely to
observe technology spillovers when later innovations have a much larger value than earlier
innovations. This is the case when the pace of technological innovation within the industry
is very intense and a new version of an existing product not only makes the old version
completely obsolete but considerably reduces production costs and/or increases the value
to the consumers. For instance, a new microchip with expanded computational capability
is likely to oﬀer much more value to the consumers and have a larger demand because of
a larger array of applications. A somewhat diﬀerent interpretation of this result is that
we are more likely to observe technology spillovers when innovation 1 is based on basic
knowledge with little commercial value, whereas innovation 2 is an application with a much
larger market and value. For instance, innovation 1 could be a research tool which enables
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the development of innovation 2, but has not direct commercial value (π1 = 0).
The following remark summarizes the comparative statics analysis:
Remark 2 Technology spillovers arise for a larger parameter space if the relative value
of the second innovation is high, competition is soft, and the probability of innovating is
intermediate.
Proof. Using (3), define Φ ≡ s1−s
π2
π1 [1− 2 (1− α) s]− (1− s) (1− 2α)− 2sα. The proof
follows from: ∂Φ/∂(π2π1 ) > 0 and ∂Φ/∂α > 0 if the conditions in Remark 1 are satisfied.
Furthermore, ∂Φ/∂s > 0 (< 0) for s < (>)s ≡ 1−
r
(1−2α)π2π1
1+2
π2
π1
−2α(2+π2π1 )
where s ∈ (0, 1).
At this stage we are now able to compute the expected profits of the firms when they
decide to cluster. The expected profits depend on the result of the hiring process. Hence,
we have:
Πclust =



s2 (απ1 + V11) + s (1− s) (π1 + 2V11 − ws) + (1− s)2 V00
if 2V11 ≥ V10 + V01,
s2 (απ1 + V11) + s (1− s) (π1 + V10 + V01 − wns) + (1− s)2 V00
otherwise,
(4)
where ws = V10 − V11 and wns = V11 − V01.
We can now analyze the initial location choice of the firms.
Proposition 1 Firms choose to locate in the same region if and only if
2V11 − V10 − V01 > ws = V10 − V11. (5)
Proof. It follows directly from comparing (4) and (2).
First notice that the condition for firms to cluster is more stringent than the one driving
technology spillovers. Technology spillovers are the only reason to cluster in our model.
Therefore, firms would not cluster if technology spillovers could not arise, as a joint location
would increase the expected wage of the workers and bring no benefits.12
Suppose now that (3) is satisfied, so technology spillovers can arise when firms cluster.
The choice to cluster can be seen as an ex-ante agreement to share the knowledge of the
first innovation in states where only one firm is successful. Ex-post, technology spillovers
reduce the profits of the successful firm and increase the profits of the unsuccessful one.
However, as (3) holds, the successful firm loses less than the unsuccessful firm gains,
so technology spillovers increase expected joint profits (gross of wages). It follows that
technology spillovers also increase ex-ante expected profits, since firms are equally likely
12Of course, the firms may cluster for reasons that are not captured in our model; see the discussion in
the introduction.
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to end up as the successful or the unsuccessful firm. The cost associated with technology
spillovers is the higher expected wage earned by the workers due to the competition in
the labor market. Condition (5) thus simply states that firms cluster if and only if the
benefits from technology spillovers (the left hand side of equation 5) are greater than the
additional wage bill (the right hand side of equation 5).
Condition (5) can be rewritten as follows:
s
1− s
π2
π1
[1− 3 (1− α) s] > (1− s) (1− 2α) + 3sα,
and is illustrated in Figure 4.
Technology spillover condition
Clustering
Separation
s
α
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Figure 4. The equilibrium location of the firms (π2/π1 = 3). Above the solid line, the
firms cluster and below they locate separately. The dashed line indicates the technology
spillover condition.
Similarly to condition (3), condition (5) is likely to be satisfied for high values of π2/π1
and α and for intermediate values of s. This suggests that local industrial districts with
high levels of labor turnover, like Silicon Valley, are associated with industries or sectors
where the pace of technological innovation is rapid and leadership is changing frequently.
It is less likely that we observe clustering and workers’ mobility in more mature and stable
industries. Our model would thus predict a positive correlation between of the geographic
concentration of R&D activities, growth rate of profits, and volatility of market shares.
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4 Trade Secret Laws
Clustering is always welfare improving for the parameters such technology spillovers can
arise, because knowledge sharing through labor mobility leads to more innovation and
competition. However, as we have shown in the previous section, firms may choose to
locate in separate regions even if technology spillovers could occur. The reason is that
workers capture a substantial part of the rents generated by the innovation under clustering
because of labor market competition.
According to trade secret laws, it is not legal to obtain a rival’s trade secrets from
one of its former employees.13 In practice, however, the protection provided by trade
secret laws is far from perfect. Firstly, the alleging firm must demonstrate that a trade
secret existed. This often proves diﬃcult as the information constituting a trade secret is
unknown to the public. Secondly, courts are concerned about workers’ freedom to seek new
job opportunities. They are therefore reluctant to prevent an employee from working for a
rival by granting an injunctive relief or enforcing a very restrictive non-compete covenant.
Even if trade secret laws build on the same principles everywhere, there are diﬀerences in
the extent to which they are enforced. Legal scholars have argued that the protection of
trade secrets is particularly weak in California (Gilson, 1999; Hyde, 1998).14 Furthermore,
they claim that this is the key to the observed high rate of labor mobility, and ultimately
to Silicon Valley’s success as a local industrial district. We argue here that this argument is
partially incorrect. It is shown that some degree of trade secret protection not only favors
clustering, but it does not reduce technology spillovers. It is only when the protection is
excessive that technology spillovers and clustering may be discouraged.
We model trade secret protection by assuming that if a worker brings valuable knowl-
edge to a rival, the hiring firm has to pay the damages established by the court.15 Denote
as D ∈ [0,∞) the amount of (expected) damages. Suppose that firm A has developed
the first innovation, but firm B has not. Firm A’s valuation of the worker is modified
as follows: v0A = V10 − V11 − D, because it receives damages of D if the worker leaves.
Firm B’s valuation of the worker is v0B = V11 −D− V01, since it anticipates the damages.
Technology spillovers occur only if v0A < v
0
B . Notice that technology spillovers cannot take
13The discussion here is based on trade secret protection in the U.S. under the Uniform Trade Secret
Act (Budden, 1996; Choate et al., 1987). However, as the laws of trade secrets build on the same principles
in most countries, the problems sketched here are also present outside the U.S.
14Gilson (1999) argues that California laws are unique in that they do not allow noncompete clauses.
Hyde (1998) claims that California laws do not diﬀer significantly from the rest of the U.S., but the
enforcement is weaker.
15Results would hold unchanged if one assumes that it is the worker (instead of the firm) that has to
pay the damages.
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place when D > V11 − V01, since firm B will never be willing to oﬀer more than v
0
B.
Consider D ≤ V11 − V01. From v
0
A ≥ (<)v
0
B, it follows that technology spillovers take
place exactly for the same parameter space we derived in section 3. However, there are two
important changes. When technology spillovers do not take place (2V11 ≤ V10+V01), firm A
pays only v0B = V11−D−V01 to keep the worker. Still, as wns = v
0
B > 0 separate locations
are preferred by the firms. When technology spillovers do occur (2V11 > V10+V01), firm A
receives D from firm B as damage compensation. Firms’ expected profits under clustering
are increasing in D, because the damages reduce the rents captured by the workers.
Proposition 2 As long as trade secret protection is not excessive (D ≤ V11 − V01), firms
cluster if and only if
2V11 − V10 − V01 > ws = V10 − V11 −D. (6)
Furthermore, an increase in the strength of trade secret protection enlarges the parameter
space under which clustering takes place, and is always (weakly) welfare improving. How-
ever, no protection (D = 0) is preferred to excessive trade secret protection (D > V11−V01)
both by firms and by a hypothetical social planner when condition (5) is satisfied.
Proof. Solving the model as in section 4 for D ≤ V11−V01, we obtain condition (6), and
the first part of the proposition follows. If D > V11 − V01, technology spillovers cannot
take place. If D = 0, technology spillovers can arise in equilibrium if (5) is satisfied.
Furthermore, when technology spillovers arise in equilibrium, they increase both industry
profits, expected wage of the workers, and consumer surplus. It follows that if (5) is
satisfied, D = 0 is preferred to D > V11 − V01 by all agents in the economy.
Proposition 2 is interesting as it suggests that the eﬀect of trade secret protection can
be non-monotonic. Some degree of trade secret protection is always welfare improving
because it increases the expected profits of the firms under clustering. This leads in turn
to more clustering and technology spillovers. Very strong trade secret protection is worse
than no protection as it can prevent technology spillovers from arising in situations where
all parties involved would benefit from them.1617
16A caveat is in place: we assume here that there are frictions in the bargaining process that prevent
the profit maximzing outcome from being realized when D ≥ v0B . If we had assumed eﬃcient bargainging
(plus some mild, additional assumptions), so the outcome maximizing the joint profits would always be
reached, welfare would be increasing in D up to v0B and constant afterwards. Very strong protection of
trade secrets would thus not be harmful.
17 In this section we have followed the legal doctrine that studies trade secret protection under liability
rules. An alternative approach would be using property rules. Under property rules, if the court denies
trade secret protection, the worker can freely pass the knowledge to a rival firm. On the other hand, if
the court finds a violation of trade secrets, then the alleging firm can exclude the rival completely from
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5 Extensions
We consider diﬀerent extensions of the model presented in section 3. To save space, all
proofs have been left out but are available upon request.
5.1 Costly R&D
The simplest way to model the R&D technology is to assume that firms have to invest a
fixed amount of money, F , upfront and lump sum, to build up their R&D labs. Further,
assume that such decision must be taken simultaneously with the location decision at the
beginning of the game.18 As long as F is not greater than the equilibrium profits derived in
section 3, both firms would invest in R&D and the analysis remains unchanged. For higher
levels of fixed costs, the market can support only one firm (or none) in equilibrium. Since
stronger (but not excessive) trade secret protection increases firms’ expected profits, it
also enlarges the parameter space under which both firms undertake R&D in equilibrium.
Hence, some trade secret protection also stimulates investment in R&D.
More interesting is the case in which location decision and investment in R&D can be
postponed at the beginning of the second period. Here, if technology spillovers can arise
(i.e. 2V11 > V10+V01), firms may have an incentive to wait and observe the R&D success of
the rival before entering the market. Thus, a firm could enter the game only if innovation
1 was developed by the rival firm. The firm would then locate close to the innovating
firm and acquire the knowledge of innovation 1 by hiring its worker. The advantage of
this strategy is that the firm only pays the fixed cost of entry in situations in which the
probability of developing innovation 2, the more valuable innovation, is high.19 Two new
equilibria can arise. First, there is an equilibrium where one firm enters in the first period,
and the other firm enters in the second period only if innovation 1 is developed. Second,
there is an equilibrium where no firm tries to develop innovation 1 because of the possibility
of later entry. Here, entry by the rival in case of success reduces the innovator’s profits so
much that F cannot be recouped. Therefore, firms do not invest in R&D in the first place.
Stronger trade secret protection allows the innovating firm to capture a larger share of the
the use of the knowledge brought by the worker. Formally, this could be modelled by assuming that with
probability p the court decides to protect trade secrets, and with probability 1− p it rules in favor of the
worker (or the rival firm). Results would not change qualitatively. Details are available from the authors
upon request.
18An alternative specification is one where firms have to pay a fixed cost in each period, F1 and F2 (that
might be equal or diﬀerent), to run and maintain their R&D activities. Although the analysis becomes a
bit more complex with a larger range of possible situations, there are no additional insights that one can
derive.
19Remember, a necessary condition for technology spillovers to arise is that π2 > π1, see Remark 1.
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rents created by its innovation. Thus, a firm might find it profitable to invest under some
parameter constellations for which no firm would have invested with weak trade secret
protection. Once again, the conclusion of section 4 - that some protection of trade secrets
is beneficial - holds true a fortiori once the incentives to invest in R&D are considered.
5.2 No wealth and credit constraints
The workers earn an expected wage above 0 (the reservation wage) in the second period
when firms cluster. The workers would therefore be willing to accept a negative first
period wage as long as they could survive the first period by consuming initial wealth or
borrowing on the capital markets. Of course, the expected wage over the two periods must
be non-negative. Suppose that the workers have access to an initial wealth or credit of
w0 > 0. Assuming that the total amount of money available for consumption each period
should be non-negative, the first period wage cannot be lower than −w0. Solving the game
as before, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose that 2V11 > V10 + V01, so technology spillovers can arise when
firms choose a joint location. For w0 < s(1− s)(V10− V11), the firms cluster if and only if
s(1− s) [2V11 − (V10 + V01)− (V10 − V11)] + w0 ≥ 0. (7)
For w0 ≥ s(1 − s)(V10 − V11), the workers earn no expected rents, and the firms always
cluster. If 2V11 < V10+ V01, the firms always (weakly) prefer to locate in separate regions.
We see by comparing (5) and (7) that the firms cluster under a larger parameter space
when the wealth constraint is relaxed. The negative first period wage allows the firms
to extract (some of) the rents earned by the workers, which makes it more attractive to
choose a joint location.
5.3 Finite relocation costs for workers
In section 3, we have assumed that it is prohibitively expensive to hire a worker employed
in a diﬀerent region. Now, we allow for lower levels of relocation costs. Suppose that firm
i has to pay a fixed cost k > 0 when poaching the worker from firm j located in a diﬀerent
region. Here, there are diﬀerent cases to consider. First, if 2V11 < V10 + V01, technology
spillovers do not arise independently of k and firms’ locations. The firms thus separate,
as the relocation costs reduce the wage of the workers. Second, if 2V11 > V10 + V01 + k,
technology spillovers arise both under clustering and separation. It is thus optimal to
cluster to avoid paying the relocation costs. Finally, the most interesting case happens
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when V10 + V01 ≤ 2V11 < V10 + V01 + k. Here, technology spillovers arise only if firms
cluster. We need to distinguish between two subcases. If k > V11−V01, the lagging firm is
not interested in hiring a worker from a firm located in another region. Thus, the analysis
developed in section 3 remains unchanged. On the other hand, if k ≤ V11−V01, the lagging
firm is willing to pay up V11 − V01 − k ≥ 0 to attract the worker. The model can then be
solved as in section 3. We obtain that firms cluster if and only if:
2V11 − (V10 + V01) ≥ k/2 when k < V11 − V01,
2V11 − (V10 + V01) ≥ V10 − V11 when k ≥ V11 − V01.
Notice that for low levels of relocation costs, the protection provided by separate locations
is stronger the greater is k. Therefore, the profits under separation are increasing in k,
which in turn makes clustering less attractive. For high relocations costs, we find again
condition (5). Removing the assumption of prohibitively high relocation costs changes the
threshold for which firms cluster, but the basic trade-oﬀ of the model remains.
5.4 The knowledge is embedded in the worker
We now allow for the possibility that the innovating firm experiences a loss of knowl-
edge when the worker moves to a rival. This could, for example, be because the em-
ployee ’hides’ some of the relevant knowledge, or because some of the knowledge is tacit
and diﬃcult to articulate. Such a loss of knowledge translates in a lower probabil-
ity to develop innovation 2. To capture this possibility, we assume that if the worker
leaves the probability of developing innovation 2 is µs with µ ≤ 1. The formal analy-
sis remains basically unchanged with respect to section 3. Suppose that only firm A
develops innovation 1. The expected profits of firm A if it loses the worker are now:
V A11(µ) = µs2απ2 + µs (1− s)π2 + (1− s) (1− µs)απ1. Similarly, the expected profits of
firm B if it hires the worker are: V B11(µ) = µs2απ2 + s (1− µs)π2 + (1− s) (1− µs)απ1.
Following the analysis in section 3, it is easy to show that technology spillovers only occur
if V A11(µ) + V B11(µ) > V10 + V01 where V10 and V01 are given by (1). Notice that only the
LHS of the inequality depends on µ. One can show that the derivative of the LHS of the
inequality with respect to µ is always positive. This implies that the larger is µ the larger
is the parameter space under which technology spillovers take place. In other words, when
the movement of the worker implies a loss of knowledge for the innovating firm, it is less
likely that we observe technology spillovers. In the limit for µ = 0, one can show that
technology spillovers never take place. As a result, firms do not cluster. Here, the worker’s
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mobility would simply shift R&D capabilities from firm A to firm B without increasing
the joint probability of developing innovation 2. Furthermore, some profits would be dis-
sipated because both firms would have innovation 1 and compete in the product market.
In sum, our results derived in section 3 rely on knowledge being a public good within the
innovating firm.
6 Conclusion
Motivated by the recent debate about the reasons underpinning the success of Silicon
Valley, we have studied firms’ incentives to cluster in order to benefit from reciprocal
technology spillovers. Generally speaking, we find that the story of Silicon Valley, as told
by economic geographers and other scholars, is consistent from an economic point of view.
Our formal model, however, allows us to pin down the crucial assumptions behind the
argument. We find that firms’ incentives to cluster are the strongest when the following
three conditions are met: 1) technological progress is rapid, so the value of later innovations
is high relative to earlier ones; 2) competition in the product market is relatively soft; 3)
the probability of a single firm to develop an innovation is neither very high nor very low.
Especially the first condition is important for public policy towards industrial clusters. It
suggests that the unprecedented growth rate of the information technology is key to the
’job hopping’ culture of Silicon Valley that fosters technology spillovers. It may thus be
diﬃcult to ’clone’ the success of the Valley in industries with slower technological progress.
In addition, weak trade secret protection does not seem to be a prerequisite for cluster-
ing and workers’ mobility as some legal scholars have recently argued. Perhaps surprisingly,
we find that some trade secret protection is always beneficial both for firms’ profits and for
welfare even when R&D is costless, so firms’ incentives to invest in R&D are not a concern.
The reason is that when firms cluster, some of the rents created by the innovations are
captured by the workers because of labor market competition. Trade secret protection
reduces those rents and, thus, induces more clustering and technology spillovers. Once the
incentives to invest in R&D are considered the benefits of stronger trade secret protec-
tion are even greater. It is only when the protection of trade secrets is so strong that no
mobility of workers can take place that incentives to cluster and welfare are reduced.
It remains to speculate about possible extensions of the model. A particularly inter-
esting, yet diﬃcult one, is to consider a richer R&D technology where the probability to
innovate depends on both the R&D investment of the firm and the eﬀort of the worker. We
speculate that in such a framework firms might cluster to provide high-powered incentives
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to workers, as an innovation is then (sometimes) rewarded with an outside oﬀer and a wage
increase.20 This, as well as other potential extensions of our model, are left for further
research.
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